Financial Reform and Regulation - Obama Presidency Oral History
By March 2008, instability on Wall Street had centered global finance and the possibility of an economic crisis in the 2008 presidential campaign. Less than two weeks after the collapse of the investment bank Bear Stearns, Barack Obama outlined his economic vision in a major address in lower Manhattan. “To renew our economy and to ensure that we are not doomed to repeat a cycle of bubble and bust again and again and again, we need to address not only the immediate crisis,” he told the assembled crowd, “We also need to create a 21st-century regulatory framework.” Once in office, the Obama administration pursued that framework through four areas of activity: investigating the causes of the 2008 crisis, developing new systems and strategies for financial regulation and oversight, creating new government powers to protect consumers, and negotiating a new international regulatory framework. The Obama Presidency Oral History provides wide-ranging coverage of these efforts, and illuminates the administration’s attempts to reckon with the status of one of the period’s most powerful global industries.
The 2008 financial crisis was triggered by a convergence of short-term events with structural vulnerabilities in the US economy and global financial system. These included regulatory failures, insufficient risk-management by financial firms, and losses on mortgage-backed securities after the decline of housing prices. In the United States, the acute phase of the crisis occurred in the autumn of 2008, when officials took extraordinary emergency measures to stabilize fragile firms and restore confidence in the financial system. That period, and those measures, are discussed on the Financial Crisis topic page.
By the summer of 2009, government action had largely reduced the risk of further American bank failures, and the administration could turn its attention to reducing the likelihood of future, similar crises. By then, Obama had already signed limited, bipartisan measures to protect consumers and prevent banks that had received public funds from awarding large bonuses to their employees. To assuage concerns about the solvency of the country’s largest banks, the Federal Reserve had also begun to conduct “stress tests,” forcing banks to simulate the effects of financial shocks, and raise the funds necessary to cover projected shortfalls. The program helped stabilize the banking sector, but raised new questions about the entanglement between Washington and Wall Street, as supervisors effectively conveyed official approval on the activities of banks that “passed” the tests.
Timothy Geithner
Secretary of the Treasury
Austan Goolsbee
Council of Economic Advisers Chair
Wally Adeyemo
Economic Policy Advisor
Despite these efforts, there was widespread consensus that much broader regulation and reform were required to prevent future crises. Comprehensive reform would require legislation, and the administration began to negotiate with key congressional leaders about whether the White House or Congress would play the lead role in the policy development process. Unlike in the processes that produced the Recovery Act or the Affordable Care Act, the White House elected to lead the effort, and released detailed proposals for Congress to take up. In their oral histories, economic and political advisers from the White House and executive branch agencies discuss these strategic issues, and speak widely about the development of the white papers that the Treasury released in February and June 2009, which became the blueprints for legislation.
Cass Sunstein
Regulatory Policy Administrator
Dan Tarullo
Governor of the Federal Reserve
Neal Wolin
Deputy Secretary of the Treasury
Key players on Capitol Hill included Chair of the House Financial Services Committee Barney Frank and Chair of the Senate Banking Committee Christopher Dodd. In their oral histories, Frank, Dodd, and narrators from the White House and across the executive branch provide details about the long and fraught negotiations that culminated in the Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act, the landmark reform legislation that Obama signed in July 2010.
Dodd-Frank was a sprawling piece of legislation, and included a wide range of measures that responded to the varied diagnoses of the causes of the crisis and the problems embodied in the government’s response. To avoid future public bailouts of banks that had grown “too big to fail” without serious systemic consequences, Dodd-Frank created a new orderly liquidation authority to wind down troubled banks; it consolidated regulatory authorities under a new Financial Stability Oversight Board tasked with monitoring not just the health of individual banks, but the “systemic risks” facing the financial system writ large; it restricted commercial banks’ capacity to trade with customer deposits (the so-called Volcker rule, after former Fed chair Paul Volcker); limited the leverage that banks could take on; and created a new Consumer Financial Protection Bureau (CFPB) to crack-down on predatory lending practices that targeted marginalized Americans. In their interviews, economists, advisors, and regulators explain these policies, and recount the debates that surrounded them.
After Obama signed Dodd-Frank, the administration turned its attention to implementing the bill, which required regulatory agencies and offices to write and issue new rules and regulations. Narrators also recount the difficulties associated with standing-up the CFPB as a new independent agency, and speak widely about congressional Republicans’ opposition to the agency, its distinct culture and relations with other regulators, and its ability to foster direct connections with Americans across the country.
Sheila Bair
FDIC Chair
Sarah Bloom Raskin
Economic and Monetary Policy Official
Elizabeth Warren
US Senator and Economic Policy Advisor
Richard Cordray
CFPB Director
Lisa Konwinski
Legislative Advisor and Policy Official
Wally Adeyemo
Economic Policy Advisor
Just as the response to the 2008 crisis required coordination between the Fed and central banks around the world, the administration recognized that regulating twenty-first century finance required global standards, rules, and powers. In their interviews, narrators discuss the international negotiations that led to the announcement of the third Basel Accord in November 2010, which set new international standards for bank capital requirements, leverage, and liquidity.
While these efforts transformed the relationship between government and the financial industry, the continued prominence and profitability of global finance after the crisis sparked widespread anger, and encouraged political realignments. Narrators from across the project archive speak widely about the political consequences of the crisis, provide details about the administration's inability to launch criminal prosecutions of financial actors, and reflect on the rise of movements including Occupy Wall Street, the Tea Party, and the Fed Up campaign.
Eric Holder
Attorney General
James Cole
Deputy Attorney General
Janet Yellen
Chair of the Federal Reserve
Brian Deese
Economic Policy Official
Astra Taylor
Filmmaker and Activist
Financial reform and regulation overlaps and intersects with a number of other topic areas in the Obama Presidency Oral History collection, including Financial Crisis and the Economy and Republican Opposition.