Nuclear Nonproliferation - Obama Presidency Oral History
Speaking to a massive crowd in Berlin on July 24, 2008, then-candidate Barack Obama signaled his interest in making nuclear security a key pillar of U.S. foreign policy. “It is time to secure all loose nuclear materials; to stop the spread of nuclear weapons; and to reduce the arsenals from another era,” he said, before committing himself to the goal of eliminating nuclear weapons altogether: “This is the moment to begin the work of seeking the peace of a world without nuclear weapons.”
Once elected, Obama moved quickly to act on this vision, laying out his strategy in a speech in Prague, Czech Republic on April 5, 2009. In the speech, Obama argued for building on the 1968 Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT), strengthening the international community’s ability to deal with two key threats: vulnerable nuclear material that might fall into the hands of extremist actors, and the proliferation of nuclear weapons to state actors under the pretense of pursuing peaceful nuclear energy capabilities.
Obama’s April 2009 speech informed what became known as “the Prague Agenda,” a series of high-profile policies and multilateral initiatives meant to demonstrate U.S. leadership towards the goal of reducing the threat of nuclear war in the international system. For example, the administration convened biannual Nuclear Security Summits, typically attended by heads of state, which became vehicles for high-level nuclear diplomacy and for states to make and monitor commitments to denuclearization. Four such summits were held during Obama’s presidency, with Washington hosting the first (April 2010) and fourth (March 2016). The collection contains the recollections of numerous officials and subject matter experts regarding these multilateral initiatives and the priority given to nuclear security by the Obama White House.
Esther Brimmer
Foreign Policy Official
Frank Rose
Foreign Policy Official
In addition to broad international diplomacy, the Obama Administration pursued several country-specific efforts that were designed to reduce nuclear arsenals or to prevent the spread of nuclear weapons. The first of these was the negotiation of the New START Treaty between the United States and Russia. With the 1991 Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty (START I) set to expire in December 2009, the Administration sought a new agreement to limit the arsenals of the world’s two greatest nuclear powers. On April 8, 2010, the two countries agreed to a deal which sharply curbed the number of deployed strategic nuclear warheads, strategic delivery systems, and launchers operated by each country. The collection contains the recollections of diverse narrators who remember the intense bilateral negotiations that led to the agreement, who reflect on New START in relation to the Administration’s broader relationship with Russia, and who recall the exhaustive efforts to generate support for the treaty on Capitol Hill. New Start was ratified by a vote of 71-26 on December 22, 2010.
Rose Gottemoeller
Foreign Policy Official
Richard Verma
Ambassador
North Korea posed perhaps the most confounding case for the Administration’s nonproliferation strategy. The country’s provocative pursuit of increased nuclear capabilities—especially after the death of longtime leader Kim Jong-il in December 2011 and the succession of his son, Kim Jong-un—tested the administration’s declared policy of “strategic patience,” which relied on sanctions, coordinated international action, and public condemnation to compel the country to abandon its nuclear program. In February, 2012 the two countries acknowledged an agreement—the so-called Leap Day Deal—by which the United States would provide food and aid in exchange for North Korea ceasing the enrichment of uranium and allowing increased access for weapons inspectors. However, North Korea’s launch of a satellite weeks later ended the deal. Narrators in the collection reflect on several aspects of nuclear diplomacy with North Korea, including the challenges posed to Obama’s nonproliferation strategy by North Korea’s closed system, the efficacy of U.S. and UN sanctions, and the relationship between North Korea’s nuclear program and the Administration’s broader policy towards the Asia Pacific. In addition to U.S. officials, the archive also contains the recollections of Jerome Sauvage, a United Nations official who speaks about the relationship between nuclear diplomacy and the country’s ongoing humanitarian crisis during his time as the UN’s lead coordinator for aid in Pyongyang.
Jim Steinberg
Deputy Secretary of State
Jerome Sauvage
United Nations Official
The Obama Administration’s approach to nuclear nonproliferation was most clearly embodied by its policy towards Iran, which clandestinely pursued nuclear weapons capabilities under the guise of peaceful energy use. Iran’s nuclear aspirations—publicized after the discovery of a secret uranium enrichment facility near Qom in 2009—were but one aspect of the country’s international behavior which placed it at odds with the United States. The regime’s support for terrorist groups and proxy forces abroad, along with its record of human rights abuses, led to years of U.S.-imposed or -backed international economic sanctions and isolation from the international community. Despite overtures by the Obama Administration to the Iranian people early in 2009, Iran’s brutal crushing of a political protest movement that summer—the so-called Green Revolution—returned the two countries to their combative postures.
Nonetheless, the Obama Administration actively focused on Iran’s nuclear program, applying a policy that combined additional sanctions, threats of force, and—following the election of new president Hassan Rouhani in 2013—negotiations to decrease the prospects of nuclear conflict. Those negotiations, which began through a secret backchannel in 2012, eventually led to multilateral negotiations with the so-called P5+1 group (European Union, Great Britain, France, Russia, China, and Germany) and culminated in one of the Administration’s signal foreign policy achievements: the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA), signed on July 1, 2015. Under the JCPOA—also referred to as the Iran nuclear deal—Iran agreed to give up its nuclear weapons capability and accept stricter oversight by nuclear inspectors in exchange for relief from sanctions. The collection contains multiple Administration perspectives on the Iran Nuclear deal, including those from officials who discuss the campaign of pressure and sanctions—like the 2010 Comprehensive Iran Sanctions, Accountability, and Divestment Act of 2010 (CISADA)—which preceded and unfolded parallel to negotiations; with diplomats and national security officials like Jake Sullivan and Bill Burns, who remember the initial backchannel negotiations; and policymakers like Secretary of State John Kerry, Deputy Secretary of State Wendy Sherman, and Secretary of Energy Ernest Moniz who speak about the negotiating breakthroughs between the Iranians and P5+1 countries that eventually led to the deal.
Jake Sullivan
Foreign Policy Official
William Burns
Deputy Secretary of State
Richard Nephew
Foreign Policy Official
Wendy Sherman
Foreign Policy Official
John Kerry
Secretary of State and US Senator
Many narrators in the collection recall the polarized political climate in the United States surrounding the Iran nuclear deal negotiations. Activism by opponents of the deal—many of whom argued it weakened U.S. and Israeli security—was heightened by the outspoken disapproval of Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu, who lobbied against the deal in an address to joint session of Congress on March 3, 2015. Meanwhile, the Administration and supporters of the deal worked to generate public support for the JCPOA. For example, on May 26, 2015, Obama spoke to the Adas Israel congregation in Bethesda Maryland, defending the nuclear deal within the context of his support for Israel. That moment is remembered in the collection by Rabbi Gil Steinlauf of Adas Israel, the first leader of a traditional Jewish congregation to come out as gay, who advocates for LGBTQ rights. Following the completion of the 60-day legislative review period without action by both chambers of Congress, the JCPOA—a non-binding political agreement rather than a formal treaty—entered into force.
The deal was implemented on January 16, 2016. On that day, resulting from a separate set of secret negotiations led by John Kerry, Iran released several U.S. hostages being held in Iran, including Washington Post reporter Jason Rezaian, in exchange for the U.S. release of Iranians charged with violating U.S. embargoes.
Michael Kassen
AIPAC President
Gil Steinlauf
Rabbi and LGBTQ+ Rights Advocate
Jason Rezaian
Journalist
Notwithstanding Obama’s efforts to focus U.S. leadership on the challenge of nonproliferation, the goal of a world without nuclear weapons remains distant. In 2016, Defense Secretary Ash Carter announced U.S. plans to sustain and modernize its nuclear deterrent capability over the ensuing ten years. Despite calling for enhancements to New START in his 2013 State of the Union Address, no further arms control negotiations occurred with Russia. New START was extended for an additional five years in 2021, and expired in 2026. In May 2018, the Trump Administration withdrew from the JCPOA.